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During a break in the Autonomous
Agents 2000 conference last month in
Barcelona, we went souvenir shop-
ping. On the outskirts of the city, an
old man in a dilapidated store had
some interesting wares, but he spoke
only Catalan and we spoke only
English and Polish. Nevertheless, even
without a common language, we
managed to reach an agreement. We
left not only with the souvenirs but
also knowing their names in Catalan. 
How did the purchase proceed? As
you might imagine, we pointed to the
items we were interested in and the
shopkeeper pointed to the appropriate
coins in our hands. We even engaged in
some bartering by offering fewer coins.
Why did the purchase succeed? First,
we all shared a common knowledge of
buying and selling. Second, this knowl-
edge included the value of money (the
medium of exchange). And fundamen-
tally, we all understood each other’s
basic goals for the transaction. 
Foreign Agents
Now, suppose our autonomous shop-
bot agents had been representing us
by dealing with the vendor’s pricebot,
and suppose they didn’t share an
agent communication language
(ACL). What should they know at a
fundamental level, what could each
point to, and how could they estab-
lish a common language? Recent
research at the University of Texas at
Arlington has shown that agents first
establish a common vocabulary,
progress to a primitive language simi-
lar to human pidgin, then enrich the
language’s grammar to develop a cre-
ole, and eventually arrive at a full-
blown ACL. 
During this process, the vocabulary
and grammatical structures most
important to the agents’ task at hand
appear first. Thus, shopbots and price-
bots will first learn to communicate
about various types of goods and
money, while softbots that deal with,
say, stock market investing will likely
develop a different language. However,
we must make some assumptions
about the agents.
First, the agents must be knowledge
based. This means they must have a
means to represent facts about the
world, expressed as sentences in some
(hopefully well-defined) knowledge
representation language (KRL). This
is a reasonable expectation, because a
KRL is most likely to be isomorphic
to the real world, and distinct things
in the world would have distinct rep-
resentations in a KRL. The agents’
knowledge bases are therefore
assumed to consist of concepts (class-
es) organized into a superclass/sub-
class hierarchy, with the leaves of the
hierarchy occupied by objects (class
instances) identified in the agents’
environment.1-3
Second, the agents must be pur-
poseful, with well-defined goals—that
is, precise descriptions of the states of
the world they are to bring about.
Agents may have different goals,
allowing them to be self-interested (or
selfish). They need a representation
by which they can express their pur-
poses, or preferences, in terms of a
utility function.3
Third, the agents must be rational.
This means they act so as to further
their goals, given what they know.
Operationally, a rational agent ranks
actions in terms of the expected utili-
ty of their results and executes the
action having the highest expected
utility.3
Communication as Action
Using these assumptions, we define
communication as one agent (speak-
er) purposefully producing a signal
that, when responded to by another
agent (hearer), confers some advan-
tage (or the statistical probability of
it) to the speaker.4 This definition
lets us treat communication as
action,5 since its purpose is deter-
mined by its expected effects on the
states of knowledge of a hearer and a
speaker.
This allows us to apply the para-
digm of rationality to communica-
tion.6 Just as with any other rational
action, a speaker must assess the
effects of various communicative acts,
rank them by desirability (expected
utility), and execute the most promis-
ing one. To do this, a human speaker
must represent the effects of a com-
municative act on the hearer’s mental
state. Cognitive scientists7 have con-
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models of other entities
and how the ability to
form and process these
models sets humans
apart from other pri-
mates. Agents require
similar models of each
other to communicate
rationally. 
Agents may want to
enrich their communica-
tive capabilities by estab-
lishing or enhancing a
shared ACL. This is a




agents to interact with
the world and each other
more efficiently and con-
veys an advantage, which
we measure as an in-





with a knowledge base and can
choose which action to execute on the
basis of its expected benefits. The lan-
guage that expresses the information
in the knowledge base, the KRL, is an
agent’s “language of thought.” Agents
that share a KRL will quickly adopt it
as their ACL. If their KRLs differ,
they must negotiate a new ACL. 
An important part of the informa-
tion stored in a knowledge base is the
locations of particular objects. For
physical objects, location can be
expressed using geographic coordi-
nates. For nonphysical objects, we
assume there is some coordinate sys-
tem that uniquely identifies any
object within the environment. We
further assume that agents share the
same environment and can use the
coordinate system to identify individ-
ual objects to each other.
The same representation an agent
uses for its own knowledge can serve
to express what the agent knows about
other agents’ states of knowledge. For
example, to represent available infor-
mation about Pricebot1, Shopbot1
has an instantiation of the Pricebot
class, labeled Pricebot1 in Figure 1.
Information about Pricebot1’s state of
knowledge is represented by a proba-
bilistic slot called KB, whose value is a
probability distribution over the other
agent’s possible states of knowledge.4,6
Value of Communication
When creating a new message, an
agent computes the values of alterna-
tive messages on the basis of how
they would impact the hearer’s state
of knowledge and possibly change its
intentions. Having determined the
expected values of the alternatives,
the agent can decide to execute the
best one, thus exercising rationality
in its communicative behavior. An
implementation of this calculation
has been described in detail in the lit-
erature.6
Translation
After deciding what it wants to com-
municate—represented as a knowl-
edge-base fragment in its KRL—the
agent must translate it from its lan-
guage of thought into the ACL. This
process uses the grammars of the KRL
and the ACL, as well as a set of trans-
lation rules. 
Translation from the KRL into the
ACL may fail. Typically, this indicates
that the ACL is not as expressive as
the KRL and the agent is trying to
communicate content for which the
ACL is insufficient. This initial failure
and the agent’s inability to achieve the
higher expected utility that would
result from having communicated the
message drive the negotiation process
to enrich the ACL, enabling it to
express new content.
Negotiation over the ACL
The research approach to agents’
negotiation for enriching their ACL is
motivated by the evolution of natural
languages like pidgin and creole,
which arise when people from differ-
ent backgrounds sharing the same
environment need to communicate.
The idea is to use negotiation as a
mechanism by which a lexicon can
evolve to encompass the categories of
objects encountered in the agents’
environment and residing in their
knowledge bases. Further use of the
same mechanism can enrich the ACL
grammar, so that more complex rela-
tions among objects can be expressed.
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KB:  [KB1, 0.4; KB2, 0.4,
       KB3, ).2] 
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Figure 1. A high-level view of Shopbot1’s knowledge base, showing how it can ascertain
Pricebot1’s state of knowledge by referring to its own representation of the superclass/sub-
class hierarchy.
The following example grammar
has a simple structure, but it becomes
more complex as negotiation proceeds:
S → <pointing action> C 
C → c1 | c2 | c3
Here, c1, c2, and so on, are
the labels of classes, such as
“souvenir” or “shop.” The
agents can use this language
to communicate, for exam-
ple, that the object pointed
to is a souvenir. Note, how-
ever, that this language is
not sufficiently rich to
express that “Shop1 sells
souvenirs,” because it lacks
grammar rules for relations
among objects. 
The agents find labels to denote
the classes of objects present in their
knowledge bases but absent from the
ACL grammar and add them to the
shared ACL. During negotiation, the
agents can propose new labels for the
different classes and alternate their
offers until they agree on a common
set of labels, thereby enhancing their
lexicon.
The agents can specify which class
they are negotiating over by pointing
to different instances of this class in
their environment. They can reason-
ably assume, then, that the label is to
denote the most specific superclass of
all the objects indicated. For example,
if an agent pointed to Postcard1,
Postcard2, and Postcard3, then the
other agent could assume that the
Postcard class is being referred to. But
if the agent also pointed to
Necklace1, then the class referred to
would be Souvenir (see Figure 1).
When an agent suggests a label for
a concept, the other agent can either
accept this label or propose a different
one. The process can go through a
number of iterations, and under cer-
tain conditions7 it is guaranteed to
terminate with a unique agreed-upon
label or with one of the agents opting
out of the negotiation entirely.
The agents cooperate during
negotiation because arriving at a
common ACL will enhance their
communication and ultimately bene-
fit them. At the same time, each is
motivated to minimize the effort
involved in implementing their
agreement. 
Enriching the ACL Grammar
The pidgin-like ACL grammar in the
example above allowed for only very
limited kinds of statements. While
messages that can be produced in this
ACL can be useful, agents will likely
find that they need to convey more
sophisticated information. Suppose
one agent wishes to inform another
that two objects are related, for exam-
ple, as in “Shop1 is next to Shop2.”
Given this content, the sentence
translation module returns failure,
since the current ACL grammar is not
expressive enough.
In this case, the agents can engage in
further negotiation that results in a new
rule, say, “S → Object1 is next to
Object2,” being added to the shared
ACL grammar. Here, “next to” is a new
label for a well-defined relation among
the objects in the agents’ environment. 
Agents can arrive at common
labels for relations just as they estab-
lished the previous ACL lexicon—
that is, they can use labels for classes
of objects, because relations are also
sets. The binary relation “next to,”
for example, is identical to the set of
pairs of objects that are next to one
another. Agents can point to instanti-
ations of higher order relations to
negotiate a way to express them in
their ACL.
Just as with the simple labels,
agents negotiating over more com-
plex rules of grammar have a com-
mon interest in communicating but
also an individual self-interest in
minimizing the cost of implementing
the agreement. We identify this cost
as the effort of translating between
the KRL and the ACL. The closer the
ACL is to a particular agent’s KRL,
the lower the cost of translation and
extra parsing. 
Advantages of Learning
The many independently constructed
agents on the Web will





language that all agents
would understand appears
wildly impractical. Only
agents that can learn a
language on-the-fly are
likely to succeed. 
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Agents may want to enrich 
their communicative capabilities
by establishing or enhancing 
a shared ACL.
